Cleveland State Law Review
Volume 57

Issue 4

Note

2009

Stripped of Justification: The Eleventh Circuit's Abolition of the
Reasonable Suspicion Requirement for Booking Strip Searches in
Prisons
Andrew A. Crampton

Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Recommended Citation
Note, Stripped of Justification: The Eleventh Circuit's Abolition of the Reasonable Suspicion Requirement
for Booking Strip Searches in Prisons, 57 Clev. St. L. Rev. 893 (2009)

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For
more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.

STRIPPED OF JUSTIFICATION: THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S
ABOLITION OF THE REASONABLE SUSPICION
REQUIREMENT FOR BOOKING STRIP SEARCHES IN PRISONS
ANDREW A. CRAMPTON ∗

I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 893
II. BACKGROUND ...................................................................... 898
A. Fourth Amendment Historical Background................. 898
B. Bell v. Wolfish............................................................. 900
C. Booking Strip Searches in Post-Bell Courts................ 904
1. The Issue of Interpretation.................................... 904
2. The Rise of Reasonable Suspicion ....................... 905
III. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION OF BELL:
THE POWELL V. BARRETT DECISION ...................................... 910
A. Facts and Background................................................. 910
B. Examination of the Eleventh Circuit’s Rationale ........ 911
C. Does Bell Control Booking Strip Searches? ............... 915
D. Post-Powell Reactions from the Sister Circuits........... 918
IV. CONCLUSION........................................................................ 919
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the first three weeks of November 2003, thousands of protesters
convened in Miami, Florida to protest the Free Trade Area of Americas
negotiations. 1 Hundreds of the protesters were arrested. 2 On November 21, a “jail
∗
J.D. expected, May 2010, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of
Law; B.A. Loyola College Maryland (now known as Loyola University Maryland). The
author would like to thank all those who assisted him in the composition of this Note,
especially Joshua Klarfeld, Sheldon Gelman, and his fellow members of the Cleveland State
Law Review.
1

Tamara Lush, Miami Police Keep Lid on Trade Protesters, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
(Nov. 21, 2003), http://www.sptimes.com/2003/11/21/State/Miami_police_keep_lid.shtml.
Protesters gathered in Miami to protest the “world’s largest proposed free trade area.” Id. The
week-long protest was massive, with reports of a gathering of up to 12,000 current and retired
union members in one location. Id. The vast majority of the protesters were peaceful. Id.
However, the violence (and subsequent arrests) was reportedly sparked by “young anarchists,
who oppose government and all forms of societal hierarchy.” Id.
2

Steve Ellman, Free-Trade Protesters Eye Suits Over Treatment (Jan. 9, 2004),
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1073157024071. Ellman’s article focused on Laura
Ripple, a twenty-one-year-old woman who alleged police abuse after she was arrested for
unlawful assembly, a criminal misdemeanor. Id. According to Ripple’s personal account:
[S]he found herself being half-carried and half-dragged, fully dressed, into a makeshift
shower for “decontamination.” After the shower, she was surrounded by four male
officers in full-body hazardous material suits and gas masks. In a daze, she realized
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solidarity rally” was held in front of the Miami-Dade County Pre-Trial Detention
Center 3 to protest the detention of those who had been arrested earlier. 4 Among
those participating in the rally was Judith Haney, a fifty-year-old Oakland, California
native who worked as a management employee for a biotechnology corporation. 5
During this rally, Haney, three other women, and three other men were sitting on the
sidewalk across from the Center when they were arrested for “failing to disburse.” 6
They were immediately escorted across the street and into the Detention Center for
processing. 7
they were cutting off her clothes with scissors. She was left naked. Her clothes and
possessions were thrown into the garbage. “I screamed and asked for a female officer
but they ignored me,” she said. She was handed a paper hospital gown, and later
given prison garb to wear. She made bail at 3 the next morning. “I was completely
shocked,” Ripple said. “I felt violated.”
Id. It appears Ripple was arrested at the same peaceful protest as Judith Haney. Id. See
Haney Statement, infra note 4, at 1.
3
The Miami-Dade County Pre-Trial Detention Center is a 1,712 bed booking facility,
“which processes and houses all classifications of inmates” ranging “from traffic offenders to
capital offenders.” Miami-Dade County Corrections, http://www.miamidade.gov/
corrections/pre_trial_detention.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
4
Judith Haney, Statement of Judy Haney to the Commission on Safety and Abuse in
America’s Prisons 1 (Apr. 19, 2005), http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/
haney_judith.pdf [hereinafter Haney Statement]. Ms. Haney’s statement and case were
brought to this author’s attention by Margo Schlanger’s pre-Powell overview of jail strip
search litigation. See Margo Schlanger, Jail Strip-Search Cases: Patterns and Participants,
71 SPG LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 67-73 (2008). Beginning in March 2005, The
Commission on Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons was:
[a year-long exploration of] violence and abuse in America’s prisons and jails and how
to make correctional facilities safer for prisoners and staff and more effective in
promoting public safety and public health. The Commission examined dangerous
conditions of confinement—violence, poor medical and mental health care, and
inappropriate segregation—that can also endanger the public; the challenges facing
labor and management; weak oversight of correctional facilities; and serious flaws in
available data about violence and abuse in prisons and jails. The Commission’s
findings and a set of 30 practical recommendations for operating correctional facilities
that reflect America’s values and serve our best interests are captured in the report,
Confronting Confinement.
The Commission is co-chaired by former United States Attorney General
Nicholas de B. Katzenbach and the Honorable John Gibbons, former Chief Judge of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The 20-member panel
includes Republicans and Democrats, conservatives and liberals, those who run
correctional systems and those who litigate on behalf of prisoners, scholars, and
individuals with a long history of public service and deep experience in the
administration of justice. The Commission is staffed by and funded through the Vera
Institute of Justice.
Commission on Safety and Abuse, Mission, http://www.prisoncommission.org/mission.asp
(last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
5

Class Action Complaint at ¶¶ 10, 15, Haney v. Miami-Dade County, No. 04-20516, 2004
WL 2868044, (S.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2004).
6

Id. at ¶ 11.

7

Haney Statement, supra note 4, at 1.
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Haney and the women were led down a long hallway lined with several small
rooms, where they were sat down on a bench. 8 A guard removed one of the women
from the group and placed her into one of these small rooms. 9 Moments later,
Haney overheard the guard asking the woman to remove her clothes. 10 Haney’s
mind began racing. She described her thoughts:
Hearing that startled and surprised me. We had not done anything that
involved drugs or weapons; we were behaving peacefully and had been
compliant with the requests of the corrections officers during the booking
process. . . .
I leaned over to the young woman to my left and said in a very quiet
voice, “Are they strip searching us? That’s unconstitutional.” I’m not sure
I’d even taken a breath when the guard standing nearest came over to me
and in a very severe tone asked, “Are you refusing?”
What happened next happened very quickly, but in my mind I had a lot to
consider. I knew that the likelihood was close to zero that if I responded,
“Yes, I’m refusing—this is an unreasonable search and is
unconstitutional,” that the guard would say, “Oh, all right—we won’t do it
then.”
. . . If I refused, would they punish not only me, but the women arrested
with me? While I was considering what I would do, the other women on
the bench responded to the guard for me—saying in unison “No, she’s not
refusing.” This all happened very quickly, and I knew that I wasn’t ready
to risk the possible consequences of refusing to be strip searched as well
as putting the other women in jeopardy. 11
When it was Haney’s turn to be searched, she was taken to the same small, 6' x 8'
room in which the others had been. 12 She was told to face the guard, who was
standing in the doorway, and ordered to remove her clothing piece by piece. 13 She
further described the experience:
After I removed all my clothes, the guard told me to turn around, bend all
the way over, and spread my cheeks. I’m not sure that I can really convey
the emotional and physical complexity of the situation. Bending over and
“spreading my cheeks” exposed my genitalia and anus to a complete
stranger, who had physical authority over me, so that she could visually
inspect my body cavities. The only way I could cope with this was to stay

8

Id. at 1-2.

9

Id. at 2.

10

Id.

11

Id.

12

Id. at 3.

13

Id.
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very focused in my head and just separate from my body. The feeling was
sort of like floating while also feeling like a big lump.
The guard’s next set of instructions were to squat—and then—to hop like
a bunny. Remember, I’m still “spreading my cheeks,” so I can’t use my
arms to balance or assist me in the hopping process . . . .
I stood, bent over, and hopped naked under orders and in view of at least
two guards in a small room with a door open to a hallway that passersby
could see in for about 10 to 15 minutes. My genitalia and anus were
exposed and viewable to anyone passing through the hallway for over 5
minutes. 14
Shortly thereafter, Haney sought counsel and filed a federal class-action suit against
Miami-Dade County, claiming the County’s blanket strip search booking policy
violated her and other arrestee’s Fourth Amendment rights. 15 In April 2005, the
parties settled for $6.2 million. 16 Fortunately for Haney and her fellow class
members, this settlement occurred several years prior to the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling
in Powell v. Barrett. 17 Had their case been analyzed under the rationale set forth in
Powell, it is likely that the court would have found the above strip search to be
entirely permissible under the Fourth Amendment.
In 1979, the Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish explored the scope of a blanket
policy that required inmates, including pre-trial detainees, to be strip searched after
each planned visit with a person from outside the institution. 18 It held that such
searches may be conducted on “less than probable cause” and provided a multifactor
test to be conducted in each case in order to balance “the need for the particular
search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.” 19 Since then,
the circuit courts have many times faced the issue of the validity of prison policies
that require strip searches to be conducted as a part of an arrestee’s booking

14

Id. at 3-4.

15

Class Action Complaint, supra note 5, at ¶ 1.

16

Associated Press, Miami agrees to pay $6 million to women who were strip-searched,
(April 19, 2005), http://www.courttv.com/news/2005/0419/strip_ap.html (last visited Oct. 20,
2008). The article noted:
[Haney and the two other women from her group] were joined by four other plaintiffs,
and the seven will divide $300,000, under the settlement. Thousands of others stripsearched in the county between March 2000 and February 2005 could get awards
ranging from $10 to thousands of dollars. In all, those searched could receive $4.85
million, with the rest of the roughly $6.2 million settlement going to attorney’s and
administration fees and expenses.
Id. See also Stipulation of Settlement at ¶ 28, Haney v. Miami-Dade County, No. 04-20516
(S.D. Fla. Apr. 13, 2005).
17

Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc).

18

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).

19

Id. at 558-60.
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process. 20 Amazingly, through the use of the balancing test in Bell, these courts
have been nearly unanimous in their conclusions: a reasonable suspicion to believe
that the arrestees were concealing contraband is necessary in order for such searches
to be considered “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment. 21
On September 4, 2008, however, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in
Powell v. Barrett, upheld a blanket strip search policy used in booking arrestees,
regardless of whether there was any reasonable suspicion to believe that the arrestees
were concealing contraband. 22 The Court in Powell applied the Bell balancing test,
but, running counter to nearly thirty years of judicial interpretation, held that
virtually all of the federal circuits, including their own, were incorrect in their prior
holdings, which required an existence of reasonable suspicion to conduct such a
search. 23 In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit, in essence, established a per se rule
allowing strip searches—an act that has been described by circuit courts as
“demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant,
embarrassing, repulsive, signifying degradation and submission” 24 and has

20

See, e.g., Wilson v. Jones, 251 F.3d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir. 2001) (“This court recognizes
that ‘reasonable suspicion’ is sufficient to justify the strip search of a pretrial detainee.”);
Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1997) (“[S]trip and visual body cavity searches must
be justified by at the least a reasonable suspicion.”); Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248, 1255
(6th Cir. 1989) (“[A] strip search of a person arrested for a traffic violation or other minor
offense not normally associated with violence and concerning whom there is no individualized
reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is carrying or concealing a weapon or other contraband,
is unreasonable.”); Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 802 (2d Cir. 1986) (“We hold that the Fourth
Amendment precludes prison officials from performing strip/body cavity searches of arrestees
charged with misdemeanors or other minor offenses unless the officials have a reasonable
suspicion that the arrestee is concealing weapons or other contraband based on the crime
charged, the particular characteristics of the arrestee, and/or the circumstances of the arrest.”);
Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[W]e hold that arrestees charged with
minor offenses may be subjected to a strip search only if jail officials possess a reasonable
suspicion that the individual arrestee is carrying or concealing contraband.”), overruled on
other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1040 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999) (en
banc); Stewart v. Lubbock County, 767 F.2d 153, 156-57 (5th Cir. 1985) (“Because Lubbock
County’s strip search policy was applied to minor offenders awaiting bond when no
reasonable suspicion existed that they as a category of offenders or individually might possess
weapons or contraband, under the balancing test of Wolfish we find such searches
unreasonable and the policy to be in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”); Mary Beth G. v.
City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1273 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[W]e agree with the district court in
Jane Does that ensuring the security needs of the City by strip searching plaintiffs-appellees
was unreasonable without a reasonable suspicion by the authorities that either of the twin
dangers of concealing weapons or contraband existed.”).
21
Wilson, 251 F.3d at 1343; Swain, 117 F.3d at 7; Masters, 872 F.2d at 1255; Weber, 804
F.2d at 802; Giles, 746 F.2d at 617, overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin, 199 F.3d
at 1040 n.1; Stewart, 767 F.2d at 156-57; Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1273.
22

Powell, 541 F.3d at 1300.

23

Id. at 1310.

24

Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272.
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“instinctively give[n] [the Supreme Court] most pause” 25 —to be conducted, absent
any cause, on all arrestees during the process of booking. 26
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Powell v. Barrett misinterpreted the rationale
and balancing test provided by the Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish. This
misinterpretation lies in the Eleventh Circuit’s failure to recognize the fundamental
factual distinctions between, and thus, the different justifications behind, strip
searches of inmates after planned contact visits (as in Bell) and strip searches of
arrestees as part of the facility’s booking process (as in the Powell and the
“reasonable suspicion” cases). Because of the difference between the facts in Bell
and the facts set forth before it, the Eleventh Circuit should not have found the Bell
case to be specifically controlling, and, in the alternative, should have found, as
nearly all the federal circuits had before it, that reasonable suspicion is required to
conduct strip searches of arrestees during the booking process.
Part II of this Note will provide an historical judicial background of the decisions
leading up to the Powell v. Barrett decision. This section will first take a brief look
at the history of the prison strip search before conducting an in-depth analysis at the
Bell v. Wolfish decision, including the facts, rationale, and ambiguities of the
decision. Next, this Note will examine the subsequent use of the Bell v. Wolfish
decision by the federal courts in the context of strip searches conducted pursuant to
facilities’ booking policies, focusing on the rise of the “reasonable suspicion”
standard. Part III of this Note will look at the decision in Powell itself. This section
will start by examining the factual background of the case. It will then delve into a
detailed analysis of the rationale that the Eleventh Circuit employed to reach its
decision and demonstrate why this rationale is misapplied in light of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Bell v. Wolfish and the federal court decisions that followed.
Finally, this Note will examine reactions from other circuit courts since the Eleventh
Circuit decided Powell.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Fourth Amendment Historical Background
The Fourth Amendment provides, in pertinent part:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized. 27
The plain language of the amendment states that one only has a right to be free from
searches that are “unreasonable” in nature. 28
As expected, the historical
25

Bell, 441 U.S. at 558.

26

Powell, 541 F.3d at 1316.

27

U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that
the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
28

U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Gabriel M. Helmer, Strip Search and the Felony Detainee:
A Case for Reasonable Suspicion, 81 B.U. L. REV. 239, 243 (2001).
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development of the Fourth Amendment has been largely consumed by the debate
over what, in fact, constitutes an “unreasonable” (or “reasonable”) search. 29
However, in the context of prisons, the historical debate, for the majority of the
Fourth Amendment’s existence, has not been whether searches of those in prisons,
including arrestees, were “reasonable” or “unreasonable,” but whether such persons
were even afforded certain rights under the Constitution. 30 Until the mid-twentieth
century, the answer was clear: They were not. 31
Gabriel Helmer, in his article Strip Search and the Felony Detainee: A Case for
Reasonable Suspicion, provides a thorough look at the history of prison strip
searches in the United States. 32 He notes that the ratification of the Fourth
Amendment essentially brought no change to the rights of arrestees. 33 Those
entering jails in the early 1800s were “still routinely stripped and examined.” 34
Quoting a work on the history of imprisonment in the United States, Helmer remarks
on the brutality and inhumanity of the searches that continued to exist under the
Fourth Amendment:
The prison authorities put their new arrival through a crunching but
meticulously organized admission ritual, which, besides degrading him,
was meant to extract every kind of personal information, for entry into the
prison record he never was permitted to see. There was the mortification
of being stripped naked in front of others, and the mortification of being
exposed to naked others. He was probed and tested, and layer by layer his
individuality was stripped away, and he was assigned a new identity. . . . 35
Not only were such acts being carried out, but they were, in essence, being permitted
by the courts. 36 Helmer notes the “slaves of the state” concept some courts adopted
prior to the civil rights movement when establishing prisoners’ individual rights:
A convicted felon, whom the law in its humanity punishes by confinement
in the penitentiary instead of with death, is subject while undergoing that
punishment, to all the laws which the Legislature in its wisdom may enact
. . . . He has, as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty,

29

Helmer, supra note 28, at 243-44.

30

Id. at 248.

31

Id. (citing SCOTT CHRISTIANSON, WITH LIBERTY FOR SOME: 500 YEARS OF
IMPRISONMENT IN AMERICA 251-52 (1998)) (noting that “[i]nmates were not entitled to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” and later, “Americans’ constitutional rights effectively
stopped at the prison gate”).
32

Helmer, supra note 28, at 242-50.

33

Id. at 247 (citing CHRISTIANSON, supra note 31, at 114) (describing how each convict
arriving at the New York State Prison at Auburn during the mid 1820s “was admitted
according to a carefully developed ritual. First his irons were taken off and he was stripped
naked by other convicts . . . under the watchful eyes of a keeper”).
34

Helmer, supra note 28, at 247.

35

Id. (quoting CHRISTIANSON, supra note 31, at 230).

36

Helmer, supra note 28, at 249.
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but all his personal rights except those which the law in its humanity
accords to him. He is for the time being a slave of the State. He is
civiliter mortuus; and his estate, if he has any is administered like that of a
dead man. 37
During this time, the “courts employed a ‘hands-off’ approach that detained the
Constitution at the prison gate”—providing “absolute deference to prison
officials.” 38 However, “[d]uring the 1940s courts limited this ‘hands-off’ approach,”
with some holding that a “prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except
those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by law.” 39
After the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, penal officials began to openly
recognize “the value of preserving—to the maximum feasible extent—civil rights
and privileges during incarceration.” 40 Finally, in 1974 the Supreme Court, in Wolff
v. McDonnell, held that “[t]here is no iron curtain between the Constitution and the
prisons of this country.” 41 Thus, “170 years after the ratification of the Fourth
Amendment” both prisoners and arrestees gained some limited protection from the
Bill of Rights. 42
B. Bell v. Wolfish
On November 28, 1975, just seventeen months after the Supreme Court’s
proclamation in Wolff, Louis Wolfish, an inmate at the Metropolitan Correctional
Center (“MCC”) in New York City, sought a writ of habeas corpus because of
allegedly unconstitutional conditions at the facility. 43 A week later, the suit was
declared a class action on behalf of all inmates at the facility. 44
At the time of the action, the MCC was just several months old. 45 The facility
housed a wide variety of inmates, ranging from pretrial detainees to sentenced
prisoners. 46 Justice Rehnquist colorfully described the MCC as differing “markedly

37

Id. (quoting Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871)).

38

Helmer, supra note 28, at 249 (citing Abdul Wali v. Couglin, 754 F.2d 1015, 1029 (2d
Cir. 1985)) (describing standards for reviewing claimed violations of prisoners’ rights).
39
Helmer, supra note 28, at 249-50 (quoting Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th
Cir. 1944)).
40

Helmer, supra note 28, at 250 (quoting AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND COUNCIL OF
STATE GOVERNMENTS, COMPENDIUM OF MODEL CORRECTIONAL LEGISLATION AND STANDARDS,
V-3 (1972)).
41
Helmer, supra note 28, at 250 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56
(1974)).
42

Helmer, supra note 28, at 250.

43

Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 121-23 (2d. Cir. 1978).

44

Id. at 122.

45

Id. The MCC was opened in August, 1975. Id. at 121.

46

The MCC held pretrial detainees, convicted inmates awaiting sentencing or
transportation to federal prison, convicted inmates who were serving relatively short sentences
in a service capacity, convicted inmates who were being held at the MCC on writs to testify or
stand trial, witnesses in protective custody, and persons incarcerated for contempt of court. Id.
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from the familiar image of a jail; there are no barred cells, dank, colorless corridors,
or clanging steel gates. It was intended to include the most advanced and innovative
features of modern design of detention facilities.” 47
Despite the facility’s modern design, the jail quickly encountered issues with
overcrowding. 48 Due to an “unprecedented rise in pretrial and sentenced” inmates,
“the MCC’s administrators . . . pressed into service every square foot of space which
conceivably could be used as sleeping space,” with many new arrivals “forced to
sleep on sofas or cots in the common areas under the glare of constantly burning
lights.” 49 The result was the destruction of “any modicum of privacy for many
pretrial detainees.” 50
These conditions were the impetus for the original action, but the petition was
soon amended to include a “litany of woes [that] touched on almost all aspects of the
institution’s conditions and practices,” including the facility’s strip search policy. 51
The policy consisted of “strip searching” every inmate at MCC after every contact
visit with a person from outside the institution. 52 If male, the search consisted of the
inmate, “[i]n the presence of a corrections officer, . . . remov[ing] his clothes,
display[ing] his armpits, open[ing] his mouth, rais[ing] his genitals, display[ing] the
bottoms of his feet, and spread[ing] his buttocks for visual anal inspection.” 53

at 123 n.6. At the time of the district court’s order, the MCC was, in essence, a short-term
detainment facility, with 50% of all MCC inmates spending less than thirty days at the facility
and 73% less than sixty days. United States ex rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 127
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). Of the unsentenced detainees, over half spent ten days or less at the MCC,
three-quarters were released within a month, and more than 85% were released within sixty
days. Wolfish, 573 F.2d at 129 n.25.
47

Bell, 441 U.S. at 525.

48

Wolfish, 573 F.2d at 122.

49

Id.

50

Id.

51

Id. at 123. Including the strip search policy, this “litany of woes” also contained
complaints of:
inadequate phone service; . . . room searches outside the inmate’s presence; a
prohibition against the receipt of packages or the use of personal typewriters;
interference with, and monitoring of, personal mail; inadequate and arbitrary
disciplinary and grievance procedures; inadequate classification of prisoners; improper
treatment of non-English speaking inmates; unsanitary conditions; poor ventilation;
inadequate and unsanitary food; the denial of furloughs; unannounced transfers;
improper restrictions on religious freedom; and an insufficient and inadequately
trained staff.
Id. at 123 n.7. With respect to modern complaints regarding prison conditions, it should be
noted that the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1997 requires prisoners to first exhaust
administrative remedies before bringing suit in federal court. See Danielle M. McGill, To
Exhaust or Not to Exhaust?: The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act Requires Prisoners to
Exhaust All Administrative Remedies Before Filing Excessive Force Claims in Federal Court,
50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 129 (2003).
52

Bell, 441 U.S. at 558.

53

Wolfish, 439 F. Supp. at 146.
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Female inmates were subject to a similar procedure, with the inclusion of a visual
vaginal inspection. 54
The district court described the act as “unpleasant, embarrassing, and
humiliating” and “calculated to trigger, in the officer and inmate respectively,
feelings of sadism, terror, and incipient masochism that no one alive could have
failed to predict.” 55 Weighing the fact that only one item of contraband had been
found as a result of the policy, the court held that “[t]hese affronts, repulsive in the
most evident respects, [were] not warranted by the suspicions” shown by the
facility. 56 The Second Circuit affirmed, holding: “The gross violation of personal
privacy inherent in such a search cannot be outweighed by the government’s security
interest in maintaining a practice of so little actual utility.” 57 On October 2, 1978,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 58
Of the original “litany of woes” that were addressed by the district court, only
five, including the strip search policy, were at issue before the Supreme Court. 59
Before addressing each issue individually, the Court acknowledged that “the
problems that arise in the day-to-day operation of a corrections facility are not
susceptible of easy solutions,” and thus, “[p]rison administrators therefore should be
accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and
practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline
and to maintain institutional security.” 60 The majority decision, scribed by Justice
Rehnquist, then moved on to resolve the issue of the MCC’s strip search policy in
just three paragraphs and three footnotes. 61 In determining the reasonableness of the
policy, the Court reasoned that “[t]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each
case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion
54

Id.

55

Id.

56

Id. at 148. It must be noted that the district court, while finding a visual body-cavity
search impermissible, did provide that the MCC could conduct a less intrusive visual strip
search: “[T]he demands of security are amply satisfied if inmates are required to disrobe, to
have their clothing subjected to inspection, and to present open hands and arms to demonstrate
the absence of concealed objects.” Yet, the court did so with hesitation: “Even this much the
court allows with grave reluctance, inviting reconsideration by wiser judges or respondents
themselves in the more mature wisdom of future times. Id. The distinction between the visual
strip search and the visual body-cavity search, for the purpose of this Note, are further
discussed infra note 140.
57

Wolfish, 573 F.2d at 131.

58

Bell v. Wolfish, 439 U.S. 816 (1978).

59

Bell, 441 U.S. at 520-22. The four other issues were: the confinement of two inmates in
cells originally intended for one; a rule prohibiting inmates from receiving hardcover books
that were not mailed from publishers or bookstores; a rule prohibiting the receipt of outside
packages of food and personal items; and a requirement that pretrial detainees remain outside
their rooms during “shake-down” inspections. The Court ruled in favor of the facility on all
four of these issues. Id.
60

Id. at 547.

61

Id. at 558-60.
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of personal rights that the search entails.” 62 The Court then provided a four-factor
balancing test, which would be oft-applied by subsequent lower courts in the specific
context of prison facilities: “Courts must consider the scope of the particular
intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and
the place in which it is conducted.” 63
The opinion then attempted to apply this balancing test, albeit in an implicit and
out-of-order fashion. First, the Court combined the third and fourth factors
(justification and place), noting that the “[s]muggling of money, drugs, weapons, and
other contraband is all too common an occurrence. And inmate attempts to secrete
these items into the facility by concealing them in body cavities [have been]
documented.” 64 In addressing the lower courts’ belief that the searches were not
justified, in part, because only one item of contraband had resulted from the searches
under the policy, the Court held that such a fact was likely indicative of the
effectiveness of the policy as a deterrent (as opposed to a lack of actual interest to
smuggle items into the facility). 65 In addressing the scope of the visual body-cavity
search, the Court stated that it did not “underestimate the degree to which these
The Court also
searches may invade the personal privacy of inmates.” 66
acknowledged that such searches have the possibility of being conducted in an
abusive manner. 67 However, the Court concluded that it would be improper to
invalidate all searches of this kind just because of a rare potential for abuse. 68 In
closing, the Court restated the issue: “[W]e deal here with the question whether
visual body-cavity inspections as contemplated by the MCC rules can ever be
conducted on less than probable cause.” 69 Without providing what specific level of
cause, if any, is necessary, the Court stated that after “[b]alancing the significant and
legitimate security interests of the institution against the privacy interests of the
inmates, we conclude that they can.”70
Further muddling the issue of the level of cause required is Justice Powell’s
dissent on the issue of the Court’s holding on body-cavity searches. 71 The dissent, in
62

Id. at 559.

63

Id. (citing United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977); United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966)).
64

Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.

65

Id.

66

Id. at 560.

67

Id.

68

Id.

69

Bell, 441 U.S. at 560. The emphasized “ever,” as the Eleventh Circuit in Powell
correctly interprets, refers to the prior sentence, which discusses the “manner of the search”
factor of the balancing test. The “ever” “served to underscore the assumption that the searches
will be conducted in a non-abusive, reasonable manner.” Powell, 541 F.3d at 1305-06.
70

Bell, 441 U.S. at 560.

71

Id. at 563.
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its near-entirety, states: “In view of the serious intrusion on one’s privacy occasioned
by such a search, I think at least some level of cause, such as a reasonable suspicion,
should be required to justify the anal and genital searches described in this case.” 72
The interpretation of this dissent has been debated. Some have viewed the dissent as
a simple critique of the majority’s silence in failing to articulate a level of cause
required to strip search a detainee, 73 while others, such as the majority opinion in
Powell, see the dissent as a strong indication that the reasonable suspicion standard
was not applied or used in Bell, and thus should not, and cannot, be applied in
subsequent cases. 74
In summary, the Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish held that a policy requiring
every inmate to be subject to a visual body-cavity search after every contact visit
with a person from outside the institution was “reasonable” under the Fourth
Amendment. 75 The Court did not expressly state a specific level of cause required to
conduct such searches, vaguely concluding that the searches could be “conducted on
less than probable cause.” 76 This conclusion was reached through the balancing of
the scope, the manner, the justification, and the place of the search. 77
C. Booking Strip Searches in Post-Bell Courts
1. The Issue of Interpretation
The Bell decision has been criticized for not providing enough guidance for
subsequent courts because it failed to expressly articulate a particular level of
cause. 78 It has been noted that the factors in the balancing test in Bell are not unlike
the traditional and “common tools used to determine the extent of constitutional
protection [under the Fourth Amendment]: the degree of individual violation
balances against the importance and necessity of the public interest.” 79 As a result,
post-Bell courts were essentially left with a non-particularized balancing test, no
explicitly mentioned level of cause (just “less than probable cause”), and a holding
that only directly resolved one particular strip search policy (after contact visits).
Because of the ambiguity of the decision, subsequent courts that had to determine
the validity of prison facility strip searches that took place outside the particular
context of contact visit had the difficult task of deciding how to apply and interpret
72

Id.

73

See, e.g., Deborah L. MacGregor, Stripped of All Reason? The Appropriate Standard for
Evaluating Strip Searches of Arrestees and Pretrial Detainees in Correctional Facilities, 36
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 163, 172 (2003); Helmer, supra note 28, at 262.
74

See Powell, 541 F.3d at 1307-08.

75

Bell, 441 U.S. at 560.

76

Id.

77

Id. at 559.

78

Helmer, supra note 28, at 257.

79

Id. at 258-59 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21) (“[T]here is ‘no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which
the search [or seizure] entails.” (quoting Camara v. Mun. Ct. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523,
536-37 (1967) (alteration in original))).
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the Supreme Court’s holding in Bell. In the particular context of a booking strip
search, should a court wish to uphold the facility’s policy, it could interpret Bell as
not requiring any cause to conduct strip searches and determine that this
interpretation of the Court’s holding should control searches taking place as part of
the booking process, as well as searches after contact visits. In contrast, should a
court find the facility’s policy objectionable, it could distinguish from Bell and use
the balancing test to establish at least some particular level of cause required to
conduct strip searches as part of the booking process. Incredibly, nearly all the
federal courts faced with booking strip searches post-Bell chose the latter route,
quickly selecting reasonable suspicion as the appropriate level of cause required. 80
2. The Rise of Reasonable Suspicion
The first court to apply a specific standard of cause required for booking strip
searches was the Seventh Circuit in Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago. 81 The
plaintiffs were three women who were arrested as a result of minor traffic violations
and subjected to the City of Chicago’s strip search policy that applied to all incoming
detainees. 82 The search was a visual body-cavity search similar to the one conducted
in Bell. 83
The court refused to be controlled by the specific holding in Bell “because the
particularized searches in that case were initiated under different circumstances.” 84
These “different circumstances” appeared to lie in what the court saw as different
conditions upon which the search was predicated (searches conducted as part of the
booking process rather than after each visit—noting the former cannot act as a
deterrent) and different arrestees (minor misdemeanants as opposed to those
“awaiting trial on serious federal charges”). 85 In the latter “different circumstance,”
the court mischaracterized the type of detainees held at the MCC in Bell. 86 As noted
earlier, those detained at the MCC ranged from witnesses held for protective orders
to those serving, in general, short-term sentences for federal offenses; thus, most
were not “awaiting serious federal charges.” 87
The court began its analysis by using the Bell balancing test as a touchstone to
reach the conclusion that “[w]hile the need to assure jail security is a legitimate and
substantial concern, we believe that, on the facts here, the strip searches bore an
insubstantial relationship to security needs so that, when balanced against
[plaintiffs’] privacy interests, the searches cannot be considered ‘reasonable.’” 88 In
80

See cases cited supra note 20.

81

Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d 1263.

82

Id. at 1267. Two women were arrested for outstanding parking tickets after being
stopped for traffic violations. The other woman was arrested when she failed to produce her
driver’s license after a traffic stop. Id.
83

Id.

84

Id. at 1272.

85

Id.

86

Id.

87

See supra text accompanying note 46.

88

Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1273.
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establishing a reasonableness standard, the court stated the need for an “objective
standard” of measure 89 and cited the established rule that “[t]he more intrusive the
search, the closer governmental authorities must come to demonstrating probable
cause for believing that the search will uncover the objects for which the search is
being conducted.” 90 Pursuant to these principles, the court held “that ensuring the
security needs of the City by strip searching [plaintiffs] was unreasonable without a
reasonable suspicion by the authorities that either of the twin dangers of concealing
weapons or contraband existed.” 91
The Seventh Circuit in Mary Beth G. provided two methods to distinguish from
Bell the circumstances of a booking strip search policy. The first, and more
emphasized method, is to distinguish the types of prisoners being searched. 92 As
discussed above, this distinction is not made on solid ground, as the MCC detainees
in Bell did not in fact entirely consist of “those awaiting serious federal charges.” 93
The second, stronger, approach is to distinguish between the circumstantial
differences of a strip search employed after visits and a strip search applied to all
arrestees as part of a facility’s booking process, noting that a booking search lacks
the deterrent factor that a post-visit search may have. 94
However, it appears this Seventh Circuit case merely opened the floodgates for
other courts to adopt the reasonable suspicion standard without first discussing
whether the holding in Bell directly controls. 95 After Mary Beth G., rare is the
opinion that distinguishes the circumstances in Bell from those involved in a blanket
strip search booking policy. 96 The few courts that venture to make such a
distinction, however, do so in convincing fashion. In Roberts v. State of Rhode
Island, the plaintiff was arrested and subject to an intake facility’s strip search policy
for failure to appear at a judicial proceeding. 97 The First Circuit distinguished the
89

Id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)).

90

Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 18 n.15).

91

Id. (emphasis added).

92

Id. at 1272.

93

Id.

94

Id.

95

See, e.g., Wilson, 251 F.3d at 1343 (“This court recognizes that “reasonable suspicion”
is sufficient to justify the strip search of a pretrial detainee.”); Swain, 117 F.3d at 7 (. . . courts
have concluded that, to be reasonable under Wolfish, strip and visual body cavity searches
must be justified by at least a reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is concealing contraband
or weapons . . . . This court has held that the reasonable suspicion standard is the appropriate
one for justifying strip searches in other contexts.”); Masters, 872 F.2d at 1255 (“The
decisions of all the federal courts of appeals that have considered the issue reached the same
conclusion: a strip search of a person arrested for a traffic violation or other minor offense not
normally associated with violence and concerning whom there is no individualized reasonable
suspicion that the arrestee is carrying or concealing a weapon or other contraband, is
unreasonable.”); Weber, 804 F.2d at 800 (“We . . . adopt the reasonable suspicion standard
that governs in other circuits, which we think Wolfish suggests . . . .”).
96

See Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107, 111 (1st Cir. 2001); Shain v. Ellison, 273
F.3d 56, 64 (2d Cir. 2001).
97

Roberts, 239 F.3d at 108.
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circumstances, and thus, the justifications, of a booking strip search from the Bell
post-contact visit search in two ways. 98 First, the court distinguished the probability
of the introduction of contraband in the two circumstances:
Although inmates such as Roberts certainly have the opportunity to
introduce contraband to the prison, and may have even done so in the past,
it is far less likely that smuggling of contraband will occur subsequent to
an arrest (when the detainee is normally in handcuffed custody) than
during a contact visit that may have been arranged solely for the purpose
of introducing contraband to the prison population. 99
In essence, the court stated that a strip search conducted as part of the booking
process is less justified than a Bell search because it is less likely that contraband will
be smuggled into the facility under the circumstances of a booking search when
compared to the circumstances of a post-contact visit search. 100 However, it should
be noted that the Supreme Court in Bell recognized only one occasion where
contraband was found in a post-contact visit search, and yet still found the search
justified—stating the lack of contraband was likely due to the policy’s utility as
deterrent. 101 Yet, this potential argument was quickly struck down when the First
Circuit stated its second important distinction from Bell, holding that “the deterrent
rationale for the Bell search is simply less relevant [in the context of a booking
search] given the essentially unplanned nature of an arrest and subsequent
incarceration.” 102 Therefore, the court held that the “only justification for this severe
invasion is that [the facility in question] is a maximum security facility where
arrestees mingle with the general population.” 103 This, the court concluded, was not
a sufficient enough “reason not to require reasonable suspicion for inmate body
cavity searches.” 104
The Second Circuit employed similar reasoning in Shain v. Ellison. 105 In Shain,
the plaintiff was subject to Nassau County Correctional Center’s booking strip search
policy after being arrested for first degree harassment, a “Class B” misdemeanor. 106
Using nearly an identical distinction as the First Circuit in Roberts, the court noted
that “Bell authorized strip searches after contact visits, where contraband often is
passed.” 107 In contrast, the court recognized that “[i]t is far less obvious that
misdemeanor arrestees frequently or even occasionally hide contraband in their

98

Id. at 111.

99

Id.

100

Id.

101

Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.

102

Roberts, 239 F.3d at 111.

103

Id. at 112.

104

Id.

105

Shain v. Ellison, 273 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2001).

106

Id. at 60.

107

Id. at 64 (citing Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).
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bodily orifices.” 108 Again, in strikingly similar fashion to the First Circuit’s rationale
in Roberts, the court dismissed the booking strip search’s justification as a deterrent
when it observed that “[u]nlike persons already in jail who receive contact visits,
arrestees do not ordinarily have notice that they are about to be arrested and thus an
opportunity to hide something.” 109
The analysis of the First and Second Circuits highlight the two main methods for
distinguishing between the justification, or lack thereof, behind a booking strip
search policy and the justification behind a post-contact visit search policy, such as
the one discussed in Bell. Firstly, the above courts concluded that it was less likely
that drugs would be smuggled into the facility during the booking process when
compared to the planned contact visit, and thus, a search as intrusive as a strip search
was not justified, or perhaps, not as justified, as it was in Bell. 110 Secondly, both
courts also found the booking strip search policy less justified because, in contrast to
Bell, such a policy is not effective as a deterrent—as an arrest is generally unplanned
and without notice. 111
However, in contrast to the two courts above, the majority of the courts have
spent their efforts discussing what suffices as a “reasonable suspicion,” especially in
the context of what circumstances are sufficient to meet such a standard. 112
Specifically, there has been much debate over whether the nature of the arrestee’s
crime, in the context of a felony-misdemeanor distinction, should be determinative in
establishing the reasonableness of a facility’s strip search. 113 For instance, some
early courts only applied the reasonable suspicion standard to misdemeanants or
other minor offenders, remaining silent on the standard necessary for a reasonable
search of felony offenders. 114 In Dufrin v. Spreen, an early Sixth Circuit case, the
court, without applying, or even mentioning, the reasonable suspicion standard,
upheld the booking strip search of an arrestee detained for allegedly committing a
“felony involving violence.” 115 Yet, just four years after Dufrin, the Sixth Circuit, in
108

Shain, 273 F.3d at 64.

109

Id.

110

See Roberts, 239 F.3d at 111; Shain, 273 F.3d at 64.

111

Id.

112

See Kennedy v. L.A.P.D., 901 F.2d 702, 714 (9th Cir. 1989); Thompson v. City of Los
Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1447 (9th Cir. 1989); Dobrowolskyj v. Jefferson County, 823 F.2d
955, 958 (6th Cir. 1987); Dufrin v. Spreen, 712 F.2d 1084, 1089 (6th Cir. 1983). Gabriel
Helmer’s article focuses directly on the issue of what standard should be applied to felony
arrestees who are subject to a booking strip search. Helmer, supra note 28, at 242-43. The
above cases were brought to this author’s attention by Helmer’s article, in which they are
discussed at length.
113

See Helmer, supra note 28.

114

See, e.g., Masters, 872 F.2d at 1255 (“a person arrested for a traffic violation or other
minor offense not normally associated with violence”); Weber, 804 F.2d at 802 (“arrestees
charged with misdemeanors or other minor offenses”); Giles, 746 F.2d at 617 (“arrestees
charged with minor offenses”), overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin, 199 F.3d at
1040-41 n.1; Stewart, 767 F.2d at 156-57 (“minor offenders”); Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at
1272-73 (“minor offenders who were not inherently dangerous”).
115

Dufrin, 712 F.2d at 1085.
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Dobrowolskyj v. Jefferson County, Kentucky, appeared to reinterpret this decision,
stating: “automatic strip searches of all detainees violate the [F]ourth [A]mendment
without a reasonable suspicion, based on the nature of the charge, the characteristics
of the detainee, or the circumstances of the arrest.” 116 Applying this rationale, the
court upheld the search of an arrestee detained for menacing, a “violent
misdemeanor,” as the nature of the alleged offense alone was interpreted to create
reasonable suspicion that the arrestee was concealing weapons or contraband. 117
Thus, the Sixth Circuit moved from a rationale that could have well been interpreted
as distinguishing between felonies and misdemeanors, to a rationale that that
distinguishes between violent and non-violent offenses, at least in the context of a
strip search for weapons.
Today, the reasonable suspicion standard appears to be required regardless of
whether the alleged offense was a misdemeanor or felony. The Ninth Circuit, in
Kennedy v. Los Angeles Police Department, clearly lays out the modern use of the
reasonable suspicion standard, in the context of a strip search:
That this case involves a felony arrest does not alter the level of cause
required to justify a visual body-cavity search.
Logically, the
classification of the offense in some cases might inform the presence of
suspicion, but it does not inform the level of suspicion required. Indeed,
the reasonable suspicion standard . . . prudently invites the consideration
of the nature of the crime charged in determining the constitutionality of
an individual search. 118
Thus, the nature of the crime itself may give rise a reasonable suspicion, but
reasonable suspicion remains the standard regardless of whether the crime is a
misdemeanor or felony. 119 Yet, some courts still opine that a distinction exists,
creating, as seen in Powell, some confusion. 120 It is quite possible such confusion
exists because modern courts, when ruling on policies applied to misdemeanor
offenders, continue to cite earlier cases, such as Mary Beth G., that addressed the
reasonable suspicion standard in the context of plaintiffs before them (for example,
only minor misdemeanors)—creating, in effect, the illusion of a felony-misdemeanor
distinction.
116
Dobrowolskyj v. Jefferson County, 823 F.2d at 957 (emphasis added) (citing Weber,
804 F.2d at 802; Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 742 (8th Cir. 1985); Stewart, 767 F.2d at
157; Giles, 746 F.2d at 615; Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 394 (10th Cir. 1984); Mary Beth
G., 723 F.2d at 1273; Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 1013 (4th Cir. 1981); Fann v. City of
Cleveland, 616 F. Supp. 305, 313 (N.D. Ohio 1985); Tinetti v. Wittke, 479 F. Supp. 486, 49091 (E.D. Wis. 1979), aff’d, 620 F.2d 160, 160-61 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam)).
117

Dobrowolskyj, 823 F.2d at 958-59.

118

Kennedy, 901 F.2d at 716, overruled on other grounds by Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S.
224 (1991).
119

Id.

120

See Powell, 541 F.3d at 1309 (“some other circuits draw a distinction between whether
the person has been arrested on a felony charge or just for a misdemeanor or some other lesser
violation” (citing Masters, 872 F.2d at 1255; Stewart, 767 F.2d at 156-57; Giles, 746 F.2d at
617, overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin, 199 F.3d at 1041 n.1; Mary Beth G., 723
F.2d at 1272).
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In spite of the courts’ difficulty in interpreting the standard, reasonable suspicion
quickly became the accepted and unquestioned requirement for all strip searches to
be conducted as a part of a facility’s booking process. 121 This standard would
remain on solid ground until 2005, when the Eleventh Circuit began questioning the
reasonable suspicion standard in dicta 122 —a certain precursor to the court’s en banc
decision in Powell v. Barrett three years later.
III. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION OF BELL: THE POWELL V. BARRETT
DECISION
A. Facts and Background
On April 21, 2004, a class action suit was filed on behalf of eleven former
inmates of Georgia’s Fulton County Jail. 123 The plaintiffs objected to blanket strip
searches that were conducted upon entering and/or returning to the jail. 124 The
plaintiffs were divided into one or more of three classes, based upon the search
policy or policies to which they were subjected. 125 One of these groups was the “AR
[arrestee] group.” 126 This group was subject to the jail’s booking policy, which
required each inmate to be strip searched upon entering into the general jail
population for the first time. 127 Eight of the eleven former inmates were a part of
this class. 128
This particular portion of the booking process involved having the arrested
person go into a large room with thirty to forty inmates, remove all of his clothes,
and take a group shower. 129 After the shower, each arrestee “either singly, or
standing in a line with others, is visually inspected” by standing before a guard,
“front and center, and showing his front and back sides while naked.” 130

121

See, e.g., cases cited supra note 20.

122
Evans v. Stephens, 407 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Most of us are uncertain
that jailers are required to have a reasonable suspicion of weapons or contraband before strip
searching—for security and safety purposes—arrestees bound for the general jail
population.”).
123

Powell, 541 F.3d at 1300.

124

Id.

125
Powell v. Barrett, 496 F.3d 1288, 1298 (11th Cir. 2007). The three groups consisted
of: “(1) blanket strip searches of arrestees as part of their point-of-entry booking into the Jail
(AR Group); (2) blanket strip searches of detainees who posted bond or were ordered released
at the Jail before their point-of-entry booking into the Jail was started or completed (AL
Group); and (3) blanket strip searches of detainees who return from a court appearance after
having been ordered released in state court (CR Group).” Id.
126

Id.

127

Id.

128

Id. at 1297.

129

Powell, 541 F.3d at 1301.

130

Id.
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The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground they were entitled to qualified
immunity. 131 The district court granted qualified immunity, assuming that the policy
was unconstitutional, yet finding that the unconstitutionality was not clearly
established. 132 The district court believed this lack of clarity was a result of the
Eleventh Circuit’s questioning of the reasonable suspicion standard in dicta. 133 On
interlocutory appeal, an Eleventh Circuit panel reversed, recognizing the
unconstitutionality of the policy and holding that the unconstitutionality was clearly
established, because the court was bound by precedent, not dicta. 134 However, the
panel addressed the Circuit’s past dicta when it recognized that “a majority of our
Court has expressed uncertainty about our precedent holding that strip searches of
arrestees to be placed in the jail’s general population, absent reasonable suspicion,
violate the Fourth Amendment.” 135 With the reasonable suspicion standard
appropriately at issue before the court, the Eleventh Circuit granted an en banc
rehearing addressing the constitutionality of the strip searches of the five plaintiffs
who were searched absent reasonable suspicion (those searched solely as a result of
the blanket policy). 136
B. Examination of the Eleventh Circuit’s Rationale
The Eleventh Circuit began by providing an in-depth analysis of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Bell v. Wolfish, going into far more detail than the analysis set
forth above. 137 The court thoroughly addressed the facts, holdings, and rationale of
both lower courts, and finally, the Supreme Court’s decision. 138 Once it finished
addressing Bell, the court noted several cases that have “interpreted the Bell decision
as requiring, or at least permitting lower courts to require, reasonable suspicion as a
condition for detention facility strip searches.” 139 The court moved quickly to assert
its opinion on such interpretations, stating:

131
Powell v. Barrett, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1340 (N.D. Ga. 2005). In determining whether
government officials are entitled to qualified immunity, the well-established two-pronged test
of Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), is applied. The first prong requires the court to
determine whether the “plaintiff has alleged facts which, when taken in the light most
favorable to [him], show that the defendant-official’s conduct violated a constitutionally
protected right.” Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Katz, 533
U.S. at 201). The second prong requires the court to “determine whether that right was clearly
established such that a reasonable official, at the time the act was committed, would have
understood that his behavior violated that right.” Id.
132

Powell, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 1349-50.

133

Id.

134

Powell, 496 F.3d at 1315-17.

135

Id. at 1312 (citing Evans, 407 F.3d at 1278).

136

Powell, 541 F.3d at 1300.

137

Id. at 1303-06.

138

Id.

139

Id. at 1306.
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The Bell decision, correctly read, is inconsistent with the conclusion that
the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable suspicion before an inmate
entering . . . a detention facility may be subjected to a strip search that
includes a body cavity inspection. And the decision certainly is
inconsistent with the conclusion that reasonable suspicion is required for
detention facility strip searches that do not involve body cavity
inspections. 140
The court proceeded to explain why. “First, and most fundamentally,” Judge Carnes
explained, “the Court in Bell addressed a strip search policy, not any individual
searches conducted under it . . . . The policy that the Court categorically upheld in
Bell applied to all inmates . . . . The policy did not require individualized
suspicion.” 141
The court then delved into a multi-faceted critique of the reasonable suspicion
courts. 142 This critique included a lengthy interpretation of Justice Powell’s dissent
in Bell and a discussion of the misdemeanor-felony distinction that many of the
reasonable suspicion courts had made. 143 In examining Justice Powell’s dissent, the
court noted that the dissent “disagrees with only one aspect of the decision and that is
the failure to require ‘some level of cause, such as a reasonable suspicion’ before the
‘anal and genital searches described in this case’ can be performed.” 144 Thus, the
Eleventh Circuit reasoned that its sister circuits misread the “Bell decision as
requiring, or at least permitting lower courts to require, reasonable suspicion as a
condition for detention facility strip searches.” 145 Here, the Eleventh Circuit ignored
the fact that the courts subsequent to Bell, ruling on booking strip searches,
established reasonable suspicion because they did not find Bell to be specifically
controlling due to the factual distinctions between the post-contract visit search of
Bell and the booking searches before them. 146 Instead, the Eleventh Circuit assumed
that Bell was controlling because the type of detainees were similar in both cases,
reasoning that its sister circuits misread the dissent because “[i]f the majority had
required reasonable suspicion for body cavity inspection strip searches of pretrial
detainees, Justice Powell would not have dissented at all.” 147 Thus, the Eleventh
140

Id. at 1307. In a typical analysis of a Bell case, it would be worthwhile to discuss the
different degrees of searches that fall under the rule, as “scope of the particular intrusion” is
indeed one of the factors listed in the Bell balancing test. However, because the Eleventh
Circuit holds that the searches in this context would have been valid even if they were bodycavity searches (the more intrusive of the two), the distinction and analysis between the two,
for the purpose of this Note, will not be made.
141

Id.

142

Powell, 541 F.3d at 1307-13.

143

Id.

144

Id. at 1308.

145

Id. at 1306-07.

146

See, e.g., Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272 (refusing to be controlled by the specific
outcome in Bell “because the particularized searches in that case were initiated under different
circumstances”); see also supra Part II.C.2.
147

Powell, 541 F.3d at 1308 (emphasis added).
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Circuit criticized the conclusion that its sister circuits reached (that reasonable
suspicion is required) while entirely ignoring the premise that conclusion was based
upon.
When discussing the alleged felony-misdemeanor distinction that had been
applied by lower courts, the Eleventh Circuit rather bluntly stated that “[t]hose
decisions are wrong.” 148 The court used the Seventh Circuit holding in Mary Beth
G. v. City of Chicago discussed above, as an example for these “wrong” decisions,
stating that “[t]he difference between felonies and misdemeanors or other lesser
offenses is without constitutional significance when it comes to detention facility
strip searches. It finds no basis in the Bell decision, in the reasoning of that decision,
or in the real world of detention facilities.” 149 To classify these cases as creating a
misdemeanor-felony distinction is misguided. As mentioned above, the Seventh
Circuit in Mary Beth G. held that booking strip searches of minor misdemeanors was
unreasonable absent reasonable suspicion. 150 However, the Seventh Circuit did not
state that reasonable suspicion was or was not required for felons or for more serious
misdemeanors—it simply did not address the issue. The court merely stated that the
requirement for reasonable suspicion applied to minor-misdemeanors because those
were the charges the plaintiffs in that case were facing. 151 In fact, the term “felony”
is not mentioned even once in the Seventh Circuit’s holding. Thus, one would be
hard-pressed to argue that such a holding created, let alone promoted, a felonymisdemeanor distinction. The Seventh Circuit’s holding in Mary Beth G. is similar
to many early post-Bell cases in that they dealt primarily with booking strip searches
of minor-misdemeanants and traffic offenders. 152 But, as we saw above, in the Sixth
Circuit’s change of analysis from Dufrin 153 to Dobrowolskyj, 154 and in the Ninth
148

Id. at 1309-10 (citing Masters, 872 F.2d at 1255; Stewart, 767 F.2d at 156-57; Giles,
746 F.2d at 617, overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin, 199 F.3d at 1041 n.1; Mary
Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272).
149
Powell, 541 F.3d at 1310. Judge Carnes summarizes these “felony-misdemeanor
distinction” cases in the following manner:
While those decisions vary in detail around the edges, the picture they paint is
essentially the same. The arrestee is charged with committing a misdemeanor or some
other lesser violation and, while being booked into the detention facility, she is
subjected to a strip search pursuant to the facility’s policy. She later sues the officials
asserting that the search was unconstitutional because the guards did not have any
reasonable basis for believing that she was hiding contraband on her person. See, e.g.,
Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1266. In each cited case, the court of appeals concludes
that because the plaintiffs were “minor offenders who were not inherently dangerous,”
id. at 1272, detention officials could conduct a strip search only where there was “a
reasonable suspicion that the individual arrestee is carrying or concealing contraband,”
Giles, 746 F.2d at 617. In each of the cases where reasonable suspicion was lacking,
the search is held to violate the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 1309-10.
150

Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272-73; see supra Part II.C.2.

151

Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1267.

152

See, e.g., cases cited supra note 114.

153

Dufrin, 712 F.2d at 1089.

154

Dobrowolskyj, 823 F.2d at 958.
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Circuit’s more recent holding in Kennedy, 155 any felony-misdemeanor distinction
that once existed should be considered an anomaly, as it appears most courts apply
the reasonable suspicion standard in such cases to all crimes, regardless of felony or
misdemeanor status. 156 Thus, it is both unfair and unwise to discredit the reasonable
suspicion standard as a whole because of a few early and understandable
misinterpretations of the holding in Bell.
The majority of the Eleventh Circuit opinion in Powell is spent attempting to
discredit the reasonable suspicion courts by demonstrating that such a standard is
completely contradictory to the Supreme Court’s holding in Bell. 157 Despite these
apparently weak arguments, they are only pertinent if the reasonable suspicion courts
are, in fact, controlled by the Bell decision. Because the very existence of the
reasonable suspicion requirement, in the context of booking strip searches, resulted
from a court arguing that Bell was not controlling, 158 the outcome of Powell hinges
on this very issue.
Unfortunately, the Eleventh Circuit did not mention this issue until the end of its
argument and spent a relatively brief amount of time discussing it. 159 The Eleventh
Circuit did, however, concede that the “best hope for distinguishing Bell lies in the
fact that [the plaintiffs] were strip searched as part of the booking process instead of
after contact visits.” 160 Nonetheless, the court quickly dismissed this notion, as it
viewed an inmate entering the facility for the first time as similar to one returning
after “one big and prolonged contact visit with the outside world.” 161
The court rejected the argument that such a strip search policy fails to be justified
as a deterrent, noting that “[n]ot everyone who is arrested is surprised, seized, and
slapped into handcuffs without a moment’s notice.” 162 The court provided instances,
including the instance of one purposefully getting arrested, where the anticipation
and knowledge of impending arrest could give the arrestee the opportunity to obtain
and conceal contraband in order to smuggle it into prison. 163 “The point,” the
Eleventh Circuit held, “is that there are plenty of situations where arrestees would
have had at least as much opportunity to conceal contraband as would inmates on a
contact visit, which is the situation Bell involved.” 164
In closing, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment rights of
arrestees are “are not violated by a policy or practice of strip searching each one of
155

Kennedy, 901 F.2d at 714.

156

See supra Part II.C.2.

157

Powell, 541 F.3d at 1307-13.

158

See, e.g., Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272 (refusing to be controlled by the specific
outcome in Bell “because the particularized searches in that case were initiated under different
circumstances”); see also supra Part II.C.2.
159

Powell, 541 F.3d at 1313-14.

160

Id. at 1313.

161

Id.

162

Id.

163

Id. at 1314.

164

Id.
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them as part of the booking process, provided that the searches are no more intrusive
on privacy interests than those upheld in the Bell case.” 165
C. Does Bell Control Booking Strip Searches?
The majority, in its “[f]irst, and most fundamental[]” argument, noted that the
“Court in Bell addressed a strip search policy, not any individual searches conducted
under it,” in an attempt to compare the Bell search with the booking policy of the
Fulton County Jail in its own case. 166 Despite the substantive distinguishing facts
between the searches, apparently the Eleventh Circuit believed that the procedural
similarity of both searches (both were implemented via prison policy) alone was
sufficient enough to reach the same result as the Supreme Court did in Bell: that the
policy was reasonable. 167 In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit displayed the major flaw
that continued to appear throughout the opinion: the belief, in essence, that every
prison’s blanket strip search policy (a policy that applies to all inmates, as opposed
to individual inmates) is equally justified.
As mentioned above, the Court in Bell provided subsequent courts with a
balancing test to determine the reasonableness of strip searches in prison facilities:
“Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is
conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is
conducted.” 168 Comparing the circumstances in Bell with the circumstances in
Powell, one can easily discover the factor at issue. Firstly, the second and fourth
factors (the manner of the search and place of the search, respectively) appear to be
similar in both cases: both searches took place in a prison facility, and in neither case
was there a claim that, outside of the search itself, the search was conducted in an
inappropriate or abusive manner. 169 In comparing the first factor, the scope of the
intrusion, the distinctions between the two are unclear. In Bell, the strip search
employed was vividly described as a visual cavity search. 170 In contrast, the strip
search in Powell was vaguely described as a showing of one’s “front and back sides
while naked.” 171 A reasonable comparison of the description of two searches could
165

Id.

166

Id. at 1307.

167

Id. The Eleventh Circuit stated that “[w]hen the Court stated that ‘these searches’ do
not violate the Fourth Amendment, it obviously meant the searches that were before it, and
those searches were conducted under a blanket policy without reasonable suspicion. It really
is that simple.” Id. Immediately thereafter, the court made a point to state “[i]f more is
needed. . .” before continuing on with its lengthy rationale. The existence of this phrase tends
to indicate that the court at least had the notion that this argument was sufficient enough alone
to reach the court’s ultimate holding. Id.
168

Bell, 441 U.S at 559.

169

Id. at 560; Powell, 541 F.3d at 1301 (“Nor is there any allegation that the searches were
conducted in an abusive manner.”) (citing Powell, 496 F.3d at 1310 n.28 (“We note that, in the
instant case, Plaintiffs do not challenge the manner of the strip searches.”)).
170
Bell, 441 U.S at 558 n.39 (“If the inmate is a male, he must lift his genitals and bend
over to spread his buttocks for visual inspection. The vaginal and anal cavities of female
inmates also are visually inspected.”).
171

Powell, 541 F.3d at 1301.
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lead one to conclude that the Powell search was only slightly less invasive than the
search in Bell, if at all. Therefore, based on judging the first three factors alone, it
would be logical to conclude that the search in Powell was reasonable, as the only
difference between the two is that the Powell search may have been less intrusive
than the search that was upheld in Bell. Yet, the true distinction between the
circumstances in Bell and Powell does not rest in these three factors of the Bell
balancing test. Rather, the true distinction rests on the remaining factor: the
justification for initiating the search, which is where the two searches divide sharply.
The majority unfairly, and without much thought, deems the justifications behind
a post-contact visit search as equal to that of a booking policy search. As discussed
earlier in Roberts 172 and Shain, 173 such comparison should not be made because
there exist two fundamental factual distinctions between the two types of searches:
(1) the frequency of contraband being smuggled into the institutions for each type of
search; and (2) the effectiveness as a deterrent for each type of search.
It is well-established that inmates will go to great lengths to smuggle contraband
into prison facilities. 174 Such methods employed range from the simple, such as
hiding drugs in the mail, to the elaborate, such as night-time airdrops into the prison
yard. 175 The consensus of scholarly sources cite mail, visits, and the bribery and
coercion of staff as the most commonly used methods of infiltrating contraband into
a prison facility, 176 with visits being the most common method of these three. 177 It
also has been noted that the “majority of illegal drugs introduced during visiting are
done in body cavities.” 178 In contrast, while such authorities concede that inmates
are likely to try anything, none make specific mention of the infiltration of drugs

172

Roberts, 239 F.3d at 111.

173

Shain, 273 F.3d at 64.

174

See LOUIS KONTOS & DAVID C. BROTHERTON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GANGS 100 (2008)
(mentioning the following methods of getting illegal drugs into prisons: visits (“[t]he most
common [way]”), throwing drugs over the prison wall, air drops, recruiting/coercing
correctional officers); CHAD TRULSON, The Social World of the Prisoner, in PRISONS: TODAY
AND TOMORROW 79, 111 (Joycelyn M. Pollock ed., 2d ed. 2006) (citing the use of “[v]isitors,
contractors, inmates, and even staff” as methods for smuggling); MARK S. FLEISHER, BEGGARS
AND THIEVES: LIVES OF URBAN STREET CRIMINALS 171 (1995) (citing infiltration of
contraband resulting from visits and staff bribes); WILLIAM R. BELL, PRACTICAL CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 8-14 (2002) (citing, under the subchapter
“Methods of Drug Introduction in Prisons,” the following: mail, visiting, drug drops, work
programs, and staff).
175

See BELL, supra note 174; KONTOS & BROTHERTON, supra note 174.

176

See BELL, supra note 174; KONTOS & BROTHERTON, supra note 174; TRULSON, supra
note 174.
177

See KONTOS & BROTHERTON, supra note 174; Mark S. Fleisher & Richard H. Rison,
Gang Management in Corrections, in PRISON AND JAIL ADMINISTRATION: PRACTICE AND
THEORY 232, 234 (Peter M. Carlson & Judith Simon Garrett eds., 1st ed. 1999) (“[t]o sustain
prison drug and other crime activity [prison gangs] depend on street contacts . . . still on the
street to smuggle rock cocaine, marijuana, and other drugs into jail and prison visiting
rooms.”) (emphasis added).
178

BELL, supra note 174, at 9.
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occurring as a result of improper booking techniques, nor do they mention the
concept that some detainees may be getting themselves purposefully arrested with
the intent of having an opportunity to smuggle contraband into the prison as a
result. 179
Thus, it appears booking strip search policies only act as a deterrent under rare
circumstances. The plain truth is that the vast majority of arrestees do not have time
to plan or anticipate their impending arrest, while all inmates are entitled to planned
contact visits. Judge Barkett, in writing the dissenting opinion in the en banc Powell
decision, correctly opines that “[t]he majority’s assertion that pretrial detainees . . .
might anticipate their arrests or that gang members might deliberately get arrested in
order to smuggle weapons and drugs into jail is unwarranted speculation in this
case.” 180 Such speculation is unwarranted because the frequency of such events
occurring appears to be so low, especially in comparison to contact-visit smuggling.
The fact that the majority finds it perfectly reasonable to rely on such rare instances
where a booking strip search may act as a deterrent demonstrates the lack of
importance the court places on the “justification” factor of the Bell balancing test.
Any rational person could conclude that an intrusive practice employed to remedy or
deter a problem that occurs with regular frequency is much more justified in its use
than the same practice that is employed to remedy or deter a problem that occurs far
less often. Yet, the Eleventh Circuit fails to apply such logic to the searches of Bell
and Powell, considering them, in all practicality, equally justified.
This is not to say that the Eleventh Circuit’s arguments are completely without
merit. Indeed, there are security risks involved with incoming arrestees—especially,
as the Eleventh Circuit noted, with those who have an anticipation of their arrest.
However, the Eleventh Circuit’s solution to these risks—approving a blanket strip
search policy that is applied to all incoming arrestees—is simply far too broad and
unjustified. Those who fall under the policy will be anyone entering the facility’s
general population for the first time—from minor traffic offenders to those accused
of violating housing or safety codes. 181 Certainly there will be instances when these
types of offenders should be searched, but one should not forget that nearly all of the
federal circuits prior to Powell held that searches of these offenders may still take
place if reasonable suspicion exists. 182 The Eleventh Circuit should not have
allowed the policy to extend to all of arrestees for the sake of convenience and
extreme deference to prison facility operators. The Eleventh Circuit’s decision
would be far more reasonable, and more consistent with its own rationale, if it
applied its holding to only those arrestees who had the ability to anticipate their
arrest. Or perhaps, for the sake of consistency among the federal circuits, the
Eleventh Circuit could have promoted the use of the arrestee’s knowledge of
impending arrest as another factor in establishing reasonable suspicion.

179

See sources cited supra notes 174, 177.

180

Powell, 541 F.3d at 1318.

181

Id. at 1301.

182

See, e.g., Wilson, 251 F.3d at 1343; Swain, 117 F.3d at 7; Masters, 872 F.2d at 1255;
Weber, 804 F.2d at 802; Giles, 746 F.2d at 617; Stewart, 767 F.2d at 156-57; Mary Beth G.,
723 F.2d at 1273.
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As discussed above, the facts (and thus, the justification behind) the two searches
are clearly distinguishable. Therefore, the Bell decision should not specifically
control strip search policies outside the contact-visit searches. The facts of the
booking search demonstrate less justification to implement such a policy because the
frequency of such attempts are low and its factor as a deterrent only exists in rare and
individual circumstances. Thus, the courts subsequent to Bell and prior to Powell
have been appropriate in applying the Bell balancing test and concluding that
individualized reasonable suspicion is required for the extremely intrusive and
humiliating act of a strip search by prison officials during a facility’s booking
process.
D. Post-Powell Reactions from the Sister Circuits
A year after the its decision in Powell, the Eleventh Circuit remains alone in its
holding that reasonable suspicion is not required to conduct a strip search of an
arrestee as part of a prison’s booking process. 183 While a handful of post-Powell
district-level courts have declined to follow the Eleventh Circuit, 184 none has done so
in a more thorough and convincing fashion as the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in
Allison v. GEO Group, Inc. 185
In Allison, Judge DuBois succinctly touched upon many of the points discussed
above. The court criticized the Eleventh Circuit’s failure to properly understand its
sister circuits’ interpretation of Bell under the context of a policy requiring the strip
search of all arrestees during booking:
[T]he Supreme Court, on the facts before it, approved a blanket policy
requiring strip searches for all inmates following contact visits as
reasonable and did not require searches conducted pursuant to that policy
to be based on individualized reasonable suspicion. The Court did not
have occasion to rule on the reasonableness of custodial strip searches in
other circumstances or under what circumstances reasonable suspicion
might be required . . . . Other courts did not hold that Bell “requires”
reasonable suspicion; they held that Bell requires reasonableness and that
reasonableness, in certain circumstances, requires that searches be based
on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing measured against some
objective standard such as reasonable suspicion. 186
Accordingly, DuBois concluded that the Eleventh Circuit was short-sighted in its
attempt to “demonstrate that other circuit opinions were wrongly decided or that they
misapplied Bell.” 187

183
See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 595 F. Supp. 2d 492, 50811 (D. N.J. 2009); Lopez v. Youngblood, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1138 (E.D. Cal. 2009);
Young v. County of Cook, 616 F. Supp. 2d 834, 847 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Allison v. GEO Group,
Inc., 611 F. Supp. 2d 433, 456-62 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
184

See sources cited supra note 183.

185

Allison v. GEO Group, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 2d at 433 (E.D. Pa. 2009).

186

Id. at 459.

187

Id.
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As a whole, the opinion conveys the notion that Judge DuBois was greatly
concerned with the breadth of the policy that the Eleventh Circuit upheld. 188 When
discussing the likelihood of the infiltration, specifically in response to the Eleventh
Circuit’s concept that “an inmate’s initial entry into a detention facility might be
viewed as coming after one big and prolonged contact visit with the outside
world,” 189 DuBois held:
Although recent arrestees might have more opportunity to possess
contraband than inmates, opportunity alone does not change the likelihood
that a person arrested on non-violent, non-drug offenses actually
possesses contraband. It also does not increase the chance that the
contraband will be secreted in such a way that it will not be discovered by
less invasive searches. 190
Likewise, when discussing the possibility of those deliberately subjecting themselves
to arrest, Judge DuBois did not discount it as “unwarranted speculation,” as Judge
Barkett did in her dissent; 191 rather, he addressed it as a concern that is best remedied
under the individualized reasonable suspicion standard, stating: “In cases where
arrestees self surrender or deliberately subject themselves to arrest, officials may
well have reasonable suspicion to conduct an intake strip search” 192
It appears DuBois is clearly (and reasonably) concerned with the most disturbing
consequence of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision: the innocents who will be forced to
suffer the indignities of a strip search as a result of prison facilities’ security
concerns remedied through overly-simple and broad blanket policies. In response,
DuBois appears to quietly promote the continued use of the reasonable suspicion
standard; whose individualized application, yet “relatively low burden in the Fourth
Amendment context,” 193 provides the best balance of the right of the individual
against the legitimate security interests of the prison facility.
IV. CONCLUSION
Perhaps a rarely cited decision from the Northern District of Indiana understood
the issue best. 194 “The factual setting of Bell v. Wolfish . . . is light years away from
188

Id. at 461-62 (“The hypothetical existence of reasonable arrestee strip searches does
not, however, automatically justify an overinclusive blanket policy.”).
189

Powell, 541 F.3d at 1313.

190

Allison, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 460.

191

Powell, 541 F.3d at 1318.

192

Allison, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 461.

193

Id. at 455 (citing Weber, 804 F.2d at 802); see Kennedy, 901 F.2d at 714-15.

194

Bovey v. City of Lafayette, 586 F. Supp. 1460 (N.D. Ind. 1984). In Bovey, the plaintiff
was a lawyer (described as “a well educated, intellectually sophisticated, aggressive and
sometimes intimidating advocate, both in and out of the courtroom, who is both blessed and
cursed with an advanced case of self-righteousness”) who was pulled over by a police officer
(described as man “who has maintained his athletic handsomeness from twenty years ago
when he was Mr. Basketball in Indiana, which under the prevailing cultural Hoosier mores is
the rough equivalent to secular sainthood . . . [and] has the arrogance and aggressiveness born
of public adulation.”) for driving 49 m.p.h. in a 30 m.p.h. speed zone. Id. at 1461-62. At the

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009

27

920

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:893

[the context of a booking strip search]” exclaimed Judge Sharp, holding: “There is
little justification for the strip search of [the plaintiff] by anyone here.” 195 Because
of the distinctions discussed above, Judge Sharp opined that the legal doctrine in Bell
should be limited to the context it served, as legal doctrines “derive meaning and
content from the circumstances that give rise to them and from the purposes they are
designed to serve. To these they are bound as is a live tree to its roots.” 196 Even the
balancing test provided in Bell itself states: “In each case it requires a balancing of
the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the
search entails.” 197
Because of the factual differences between the two searches, the specific holding
set forth in Bell should not apply outside of the contact-visit context. In particular,
the decision in Bell, permitting mandated strip searches after visits absent specific
cause, should not be extended to specifically control the less justified blanket policy
of strip searching arrestees during booking. Courts should use the balancing test in
Bell as a point of reference, but continue to apply the reasonable suspicion standard
until the Supreme Court holds otherwise. Simply, the rights of all should not
sacrificed for the sake of extreme deference to absolute prison security.

stop, these two colorful personalities clashed, leading to Bovey’s arrest after forcefully
resisting to being handcuffed. Id. at 1463. After being charged with “Speeding, Resisting
Law Enforcement, Assault and Battery on a Policeman and Disorderly Conduct,” Bovey was
subsequently subject to “the Tippecanoe County Sheriff to strip-search everyone who was to
be placed in the jail.” Id. at 1463-64. He was subject to a body-cavity strip search. Id. at
1464.
195

Id. at 1470.

196

Id. (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 50 (1957)). Justice Black’s statement on legal
doctrines is best understood in full:
Legal doctrines are not self-generated abstract categories. They do not fall from the
sky; nor are they pulled out of it. They have a specific jurisdical origin and etiology.
They derive meaning and content from the circumstances that gave rise to them and
from the purposes they were designed to serve. To these they are bound as is a live
tree to its roots. Doctrines . . . must be placed in their historical setting. They cannot
be wrenched from it and mechanically transplanted into an alien, unrelated context
without suffering mutilation or distortion. “If a precedent involving a black horse is
applied to a case involving a white horse, we are not excited. If it were an elephant or
an animal ferae naturae or a chose in action, then we would venture into thought. The
difference might make a difference. We really are concerned about precedents chiefly
when their facts differ somewhat from the facts in the case at bar. Then there is a gulf
or hiatus that has to be bridged by a concern for principle and a concern for practical
results and practical wisdom.”
Reid, 354 U.S. at 50-51 (quoting THOMAS REED POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 36 (The Lawbook Exchange 2002) (1955)).
197

Bell, 441 U.S. at 559 (emphasis added).
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